One “magic weapon” owned by the People’s Republic of China is one that Mao Zedong, its founding leader, and present President Xi Jinping both characterize. Like Beijing’s growing military might, this potent weapon known as the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is causing concerns in Western nations. The operations of the UFWD, both at home and outside, have come under close examination, mainly as Beijing uses it more and more to exert influence abroad. Recent events, including the investigation of billionaire Yang Tengbo, have underlined the mounting worry about the activities of the UFWD and how they affect national security.
What part does the UFWD play in China's worldwide strategy?
Originally envisioned as a large-scale communist alliance during the Chinese Civil War, the United Front was crucial for the Communist Party’s triumph. Mao Zedong thought it was essential for the party to have prevailed in the battle leading to 1949. However, United Front operations lost importance when the party centralized power following the Civil War. However, the United Front was revived under President Xi Jinping and now forms a significant component of China’s foreign and internal policies.
“United Front work is basically about building the broadest possible coalition with all social forces relevant,” stated a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund. “This can include everything from interacting with powerful overseas Chinese leaders to directly influencing world perceptions on delicate problems.”
Although the UFWD is openly known and even has a website, the scope of its activities is unknown. Its operations span a broad spectrum, mostly aimed at influencing public opinion on important concerns such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. Targeting detractors, the department’s activities also shape media narratives about China overseas, therefore supporting Beijing’s political agenda by including overseas Chinese voices.
How Does the United Front Work Department Practice Espionage and Influence?
The UFWD’s operations raise serious questions regarding its dual function in influence and espionage. “Although it is far more general than that, United Front activities can involve espionage. It’s about organizing overseas Chinese communities and increasing China’s profile internationally,” said a political analyst. China’s activities are singular in breadth and size compared to other nations.
Along with China’s economic might, its foreign influence aspirations have expanded. Under Xi, there has been a forceful drive to present China’s might and assertiveness abroad. This involves involving the Chinese diaspora in ways that enhance Beijing’s geopolitical posture utilizing the UFWD. The department exhorts Chinese nationals living overseas to “tell China’s story well” and back the government’s position on divisive matters such as Taiwan’s sovereignty or treatment of ethnic minorities.
Operating under several overseas Chinese organizations, the UFWD frequently supports the goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worldwide. These groups have participated in suppressing anti-CCP artwork, planning demonstrations against leaders like the Dalai Lama, and frightening ethnic minorities—especially Tibetans and Uyghurs—who criticize China’s policies. “The UFWD can co-opt overseas Chinese activists and organizations to forward Beijing’s agenda,” said another analyst.
The uncertainty in the UFWD’s work fuels more worry. Its operations can coincide with those of other Chinese government agencies, enabling Beijing to claim no direct participation. Thus, the UFWD can run under “plausible deniability,” which makes it challenging for foreign governments to identify its actual extent and influence.
What ramifications follow from recent cases involving the UFWD?
The increasing impact of the UFWD in recent years has resulted in some well-publicized situations that generate questions regarding national security. Yang Tengbo, a well-known Chinese businessman connected to Prince Andrew, is the most recent foreign Chinese person subject to sanctions for UFWD ties. The UK’s National Security Act identified Yang’s alleged ties to the UFWD as a threat to national security, noting that his attempts to minimize such ties stoked more mistrust.
Yang’s story is familiar. In 2022, MI5 accused British Chinese lawyer Christine Lee of using the UFWD to build ties with powerful UK personalities through fraud. The following year, Liang Litang, a US citizen running a Chinese restaurant in Boston, was arrested for allegedly forwarding information about local Chinese dissidents to the UFWD. The growing number of such cases has stoked Western governments’ worries about China’s influence activities.
Former New York governor’s office assistant Linda Sun was also accused in 2023 of allegedly exploiting her position to further Chinese government goals. In 2017, Sun visited a high-ranking UFWD official and was advised to “be an ambassador of Sino-American friendship.” These incidents have spurred intense discussion on the thin line between influence efforts and espionage.
Does UFWD's operations blur the line between influence and espionage?
In the UFWD’s operations, the line separating influence from espionage is sometimes elusive. A Johns Hopkins University politics professor said, “The line between influence and espionage is blurry.” “It’s difficult to separate these two elements given China’s activity scale and legal obligations.” Chinese law has required citizens and businesses to assist with intelligence operations since 2017, therefore further erasing the distinction between official commercial or diplomatic activity and intelligence operations.
The rule also requires Chinese nationals living overseas to disclose their activities to the government, transforming them into almost perfect spies. Dramatic advertising from the Ministry of State Security alerts people about the widespread and dishonest foreign spies. Institutions occasionally advising students to avoid interaction with foreigners and report their actions have resulted in growing surveillance and pressure on Chinese students and professionals overseas.
How Are Western Governments Reacting to China's Increasing Domancy?
Western countries, which must balance economic ties with China, the second-largest economy in the world, against national security issues, are seriously challenged by the growing impact of the UFWD. Some nations, including Australia, have instituted foreign interference rules to guard against Chinese influence, therefore criminalizing behavior that is judged to interfere in internal matters. Further testing relations between Beijing and the West, the United States placed visa restrictions for those engaged in UFWD operations in 2020.
China has responded angrily, slamming espionage claims as “very ridiculous.” Claiming that China-UK ties serve both countries’ best interests, a spokesman from China’s foreign ministry underlined that such policies harm bilateral ties. Experts are, however, urging Western governments to give China’s influence campaigns top priority. One professor cautions, “Western governments must stop being naive about the United Front and recognize it as a threat not only in national security but also in the safety and freedom of many ethnic Chinese citizens.”
How Dangerous Racial Profiling Is in Anti-Interference Laws?
The risk of racial profiling and the possible alienation of ethnic Chinese populations define one of the main problems with the UFWD’s influence activities. Even if some members of these groups could be friendly to the Chinese Communist Party, it’s essential to separate those in line with Beijing’s interests from those not. “Overly aggressive policies based on racial profiling will only legitimize the Chinese government’s propaganda that ethnic Chinese are not welcome and will push diaspora communities further into Beijing’s arms,” said another analyst.
The story of Vietnam-born ethnic Chinese community leader Di Sanh Duong shows the complexity of foreign intervention rules in Australia. Duong was found guilty of purportedly attempting to establish relations with an Australian minister with an Australian minister on behalf of Chinese interests. The prosecution asked Duong whether his acts were driven by allegiance to the Chinese government or the community. His case begged questions regarding the general application of anti-espionage rules and whether they unfairly singled out people depending on ethnicity instead of their behavior.
In essence, how can governments negotiate the challenge of Chinese influence?
For Western countries and ethnic Chinese populations living overseas, the influence efforts of the United Front Work Department provide a problematic problem. The UFWD has become a crucial instrument for influencing opinions and imposing control on Chinese people at home and abroad as China tries to spread its influence worldwide. Western governments must so carefully balance defending national security with avoiding racial profiling and building confidence among Chinese expatriate populations to meet this issue.
One academic remarked, “Governments need to be alert against anti-Chinese racism and work hard to build trust and cooperation with ethnic Chinese communities in countering the threat together.” Ultimately, the line separating influence from espionage will keep changing as global geopolitics develops, leaving governments struggling to negotiate these muddy waters.
